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Sammendrag 
Det er ingen konsensus i litteraturen om hvordan adferden til OPEC påvirker oljepriser. Noen studier 
behandler oljemarkedet som et frikonkurransemarked hvor OPEC ikke spiller noen viktig rolle, mens 
andre argumenterer for at OPEC er en dominerende produsent eller et kartell som tilpasser sin 
produksjon for å påvirke oljeprisene på en måte som favoriserer medlemslandene. Vi analyserer 
adferden til OPEC som en gruppe over perioden 1992 til 2015 ved å formulere en modell som 
omslutter mange av alternativene diskutert i litteraturen. Basert på multivariat kointegrasjonsanalyse 
finner vi støtte for hypotesen om imperfekt konkurranse når det gjelder OPECs beslutninger om 
oljeproduksjon. Vi finner også ved hjelp av sannsynlighetsmakimeringsmetoden og rekursive tester at 
en dynamisk feiljusteringsmodell med imperfekt konkurranse er stabil i estimeringsperioden og har 
bedre forklaringskraft enn en alternativ dynamisk modell med svakere teoretisk utgangspunkt. En 
prognoseanalyse avslører imidlertid at den dynamiske feiljusteringsmodellen bryter sammen i 
kjølvannet av OPEC møte i november 2014. Mot slutten av 2015 underpredikerer modellen OPECs 
produksjon med nesten 2,5 millioner fat per dag. Vi konkluderer derfor med at adferden til OPEC har 
endret seg signifikant siden november 2014, trolig for å begrense rollen til konkurrenter som 
amerikanske produsenter av skiferolje.       
 
 
1 Introduction
The growing importance of OPEC during the 1970s and the increased perception that the
organisation could affect world oil prices initiated a large number of empirical work about
the structure of the oil market, and in particular, about the behaviour of OPEC. Yet, there
is no clear consensus in the literature about the exact nature of the behaviour of OPEC
and its ability to influence world oil prices. Some studies rely on a competitive model while
others specify models of imperfect competition often assuming that OPEC functions like a
monopoly, an oligopoly or a cartel in some way, see for example Almoguera et al. (2011) and
Alkhathlan et al. (2014) for reviews of the literature.
The study of Griffin (1985), which tests the various cartel models, the competitive
model, the target revenue model and the property rights model for the period 1971 to 1983,
is the starting point for much of the empirical work in this field of research. Among the vari-
ous competing hypotheses of OPEC behaviour, Griffin (1985) finds some support for a cartel
model where OPEC as a group is a dominant producer setting the oil price, while non-OPEC
countries behave as a competitive fringe. A similar conclusion is also reached in Böckem
(2004) relying on data for the 1990s. Other studies find that a core group within OPEC or
even only Saudi Arabia fits the description of a dominant producer, see for example Dahl and
Yücel (1991), Alhajji and Huettner (2000a,2000b) and Hansen and Lindholt (2008). Smith
(2005) argues for a model of the OPEC countries as a “bureaucratic production syndicate”
and finds strong evidence of collusion, but with significant transaction costs regarding redis-
tribution of output between members of the cartel. Spilimbergo (2001), on the other hand,
finds no support for the hypothesis that OPEC is a market sharing cartel and Ramcharran
(2001) finds some evidence for a partial version of the target revenue model using annual
data for the period 1973 to 2000. A more recent study by Almoguera et al. (2011) concludes
that the behaviour of OPEC on average over the period from 1974 to 2004 is best described
as a Cournot competition with a competitive fringe.
The empirical evidence about the OPEC behaviour is thus rather mixed. Kaufmann
et al. (2008) argue that the failure to agree on a benchmark model is not a weakness,
but rather a strength as OPEC behaviour does not fit easily into any single model. The
disagreement and plethora of models may be due to changing OPEC behaviour over time, as
stressed by Almoguera et al. (2011) and Alkhathlan et al. (2014) among others. According
to Alkhathlan et al. (2014) OPEC set the oil price and allowed demand to determine output
from 1973 to 1985. By the end of 1985 Saudi Arabia changed policy because the country
itself no longer accepted to take most of the output adjustment within OPEC in order to
defend the oil price. During 1986 OPEC switched to production quotas which was formally
introduced in 1982. Kaufmann et al. (2008) also find that the quota system in OPEC is an
important determinant of production and that Saudi Arabia closely adhered to its quota from
1986, supporting the view of a change in behaviour from that year. Some studies suggest that
Saudi Arabia thereafter has been trying to stabilize the supply of OPEC, particularly in cases
of supply disruptions due to conflicts and wars in the region, see for example Nakov and Nuño
(2013). Recently, several economists have argued that OPEC on the meeting in November
2014 decided to keep its supply unchanged despite the huge oil price drop in advance, mainly
to limit the role of competitors like American producers of shale oil. OPEC has then increased
its supply alongside a continuing fall in the oil price relative to the production costs, which
raises the question whether the organisation again has changed behaviour since the November
meeting in 2014.
The empirical studies of OPEC behaviour are typically not based on models in the
tradition of Hotelling (1931) and Pindyck (1978). One reason could be that many studies
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of oil prices based on the Hotelling set up have found little support for the theory relating
world market oil prices to resource scarcity, marginal costs and discount rates, see for ex-
ample Reynolds and Baek (2012) for a discussion. However, Pickering (2008) finds that the
relationship between extraction and reserves of oil is quite well explained using the theory of
resource extraction where the resource endowment is exogenous. Also, Holland (2008) argues
that the Hotelling framework is useful when modelling “peak oil”, although his analysis is not
empirical. Pesaran (1990), on the other hand, offers an econometric analysis of exploration
and extraction of oil based on a model in line with Pindyck (1978), but finds no supportive
evidence of a forward-looking price expectation rule. An adaptive price expectation rule fits
data better when economically sensible implications of the model, such as a negative impact
of reserves on extraction costs, are added as a selection criterion.
In this paper, we analyse the behaviour of OPEC as a group for the period 1992 to
2015 with a special focus on the possibility of changes in actions taken by the organisation
before and after the November meeting in 2014. Building on Berg et al. (1997), we set
up a theoretical model of OPEC behaviour that encompasses several of the alternatives
discussed in the literature, among them the competitive model and the imperfect competition
model of various forms. Unlike related empirical studies, our model also includes a possible
role for the resource stock to affect extraction or production costs of OPEC. However, we
simplify matters by not considering exploration efforts and forward-looking behaviour, only
backward-looking behaviour in the decision rule of OPEC. We contribute to the empirical
literature by paying particular attention to time series properties, and possible existence
of unit roots, of variables involved and searching for statistically well-specified underlying
models as premises for valid inference about the OPEC behaviour. Applying a system-based
cointegration analysis, we find support for the imperfect competition hypothesis regarding
the output decision of OPEC. The implied average estimate of the price elasticity of demand
for OPEC oil is significantly less than minus unity, consistent with the dominant producer
model. Besides, the oil reserves of OPEC seem to affect costs of production positively,
invalidating the Hotelling rule. We also find, using full information maximum likelihood and
recursive methods, that a dynamic equilibrium correction model with imperfect competition
is reasonably stable in-sample and has somewhat better fit than an alternative dynamic
model with weaker theoretical underpinnings. However, a forecasting exercise reveals that the
dynamic equilibrium correction model breaks down following the OPEC meeting in November
2014. At the end of 2015 the model underpredicts the production of OPEC by almost 2.5
million barrels per day. We therefore conclude that the behaviour of OPEC indeed has
changed significantly since the November meeting in 2014.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical model
of OPEC behaviour, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 reports findings from the coin-
tegration analysis and Section 5 evaluates the empirical performance of the two competing
dynamic models of OPEC behaviour. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
2 A theoretical model
In the spirit of Berg et al. (1997), we build an intertemporal model of output decisions of
OPEC as a cartel, assuming that the organisation being a large producer understands and
exploits the fact that its own production affects the market price for crude oil. We thus start
out by assuming a constant inverse price elasticity, ε, and a demand function that OPEC
faces having the form
(1) Pt = ε0Xεt ,
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where Pt is the nominal crude oil price per barrel in period t, Xt is the supply of OPEC
measured in million barrels per day in period t, ε0 are other factors than the oil price affecting
demand and −1 < ε < 0. OPEC has oil reserves at the beginning of period t, Rt, that is
exploited in every period by extraction or production, such that
(2) Rt+1 = Rt −Xt.
Note that we are not including additions to stocks due to discoveries. This could
have been added to (2) without changing the model as long as explorations leading to new
discoveries are not modelled as in Pesaran (1990). In line with Berg et al. (1997), we assume
that the unit cost function of OPEC’s production in period t, Ct, depends on the oil reserves,
such that
(3) Ct = c0e−ηRt ,
where c0 incorporates factor prices, but not output, and η ≶ 0 depending on the hypothesis
about how reserves affect production costs. There are constant returns to scale in crude
production of OPEC if the exponential term is disregarded. This may not be the most
obvious way to characterise a production function for natural resource extraction. Assuming
decreasing returns to scale due to a resource factor may seem a more realistic alternative.
However, the allocation of output quotas within OPEC does not take place according to a
cost effective allocation between the member states that minimises production costs within
OPEC for given total output, as a multi plant firm would do. When studying the oil supply
of an individual country or a particular oil province a cost function like (3) may not be a
reasonable choice. As argued by Livernois and Uhler (1987), there is no reason to assume
that deposits with lower extraction costs tend to be found and explored first, and that other
characteristics of deposits besides their state of depletion affect costs. Our choice of unit cost
function is therefore related to the specific period of study where OPEC has been producing
according to a quota system. We are not arguing that this choice would be the best if OPEC
were allocating output differently.
One hypothesis about production costs and reserves is that costs of extraction are
higher with fewer reserves (η > 0). Thus, higher extraction today increases costs tomorrow
and in this sense there are increasing marginal costs in output. Another hypothesis is based
on Arrow’s (1962) learning by doing theory. Combining (2) and (3), the cost function can be
expressed as depending on accumulated output (R0−
∑
Xt−1−i). Letting the initial reserves,
R0, be included in the constant term, unit costs depend only on accumulated output. Learn-
ing by doing is a simple way of introducing endogenous technological change by assuming
η < 0 so that unit costs fall as accumulated output increases. The way we model output
decisions in this case is thus based on the assumption that OPEC is aware of the learning by
doing effect.
OPEC is assumed to be acting as a cartel that maximises the present value of the net
income, NI , from its crude reserves taking the supply from other producers (the “fringe”) as
given. NI is defined by
(4) NI =
∞∑
t=0
(Pt − Ct)Xt(1 + rt)−t,
where rt is the discount rate. NI is maximised subject to (1), (2) and (3), and the restrictions
of non-negative production and an exogenously given upper limit to the oil price (given by
a back stop technology). Given our empirical focus, we do not need to go into detail here
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regarding other restrictions than those from (1), (2) and (3) because our data apply only to
a period in time when OPEC output is positive.
The Lagrangeian of this intertemporal problem is
(5) L =
∞∑
t=0
[(Pt − Ct)Xt(1 + rt)−t + λt+1(Rt −Xt − Rt+1)],
where λ is the Lagrange-multiplier, which tells us how much the net present value of NI
increases if the resource constraint is relaxed.
The first order condition with respect to Xt (for t = 0, 1, ...,∞) can be written as
(6) λt+1 = [(1 + ε)Pt − Ct](1 + rt)−t.
Note the difference compared to the familiar and simpler static condition stating that
the oil price is a mark-up over marginal costs, which would imply that the term inside the
square brackets equals zero.1 This would be the case if the resource constraint (2) was not
binding. According to the model it is generally not optimal for OPEC to choose output so
that the oil price equals marginal cost times a mark-up. For the model to be meaningful, we
must have −1 < ε < 0, but also a non-negative λ restricts the value of ε.
The first order condition with respect to Rt is more complicated since Rt enters in two
terms in the last part of the sum in (5). After rearranging, we have for t = 1, ...,∞
(7) λt+1 − λt = −ηCtXt(1 + rt)−t,
which shows the time path of the Lagrangean or the shadow cost of the resource constraint.
This condition does not apply for t = 0, as R0 is exogenous (initial reserves are given by
nature and thus not a choice variable). We see from (7) that λ is falling over time when
η > 0 since the term on the right hand side is negative in this case. This implies that the
scarcity rent of resources is increasing over time. We shall focus only on the interior solution
to the maximization problem and thus disregard the non-negativity constraint on Xt and Rt.
Notice that if reserves do not enter the unit cost function, the change in λ is zero according
to (7). This constant will be zero as long as the resource constraint is not binding, which
means that we have the standard mark-up pricing formula.
We eliminate λ using (6) and (7) and get
(8) [(1 + ε)Pt − Ct]− [(1 + ε)Pt−1 − Ct−1](1 + rt) = −ηCtXt,
where the Hotelling rule follows when both ε = 0 and η = 0. In this special case the net price,
Pt−Ct, grows with the interest rate and we have a typical Euler equation. Equation (8) also
applies for a fringe supplier who takes the oil price as given and has no market power, so
ε = 0. Hence, (8) can accommodate two special cases of a more general model that opens up
for imperfect competition and a role for the resource stock affecting costs.2 Note that since
(8) also holds for rt = 0, the mark up increases or decreases over time depending on the sign
of η. This is easily seen when the producer is a fringe supplier. If the price is constant, unit
costs will increase over time due to resource depletion and thus the mark-up falls if η > 0.
By solving for Xt using (8) and letting Ct = (1 + ct)Ct−1 we get
(9) Xt =
1
η
− (1 + rt)
η(1 + ct)
− 1 + ε
η
[
Pt
Ct
− (1 + rt)
(1 + ct)
Pt−1
Ct−1
]
.
1In this case the mark-up is (1 + ε)−1 or e/(1 + e)−1 when e is the standard price elasticity of demand
and e = ε−1.
2See also Pickering (2008) for a detailed analysis of a similar model with alternative market structures.
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We may get more insights from our theoretical model either through a number of
computer experiments on a calibrated model version or through an empirical counterpart
in which the parameters of interest, η and ε, are quantified by econometric methods. As
mentioned in the introduction, we rely on the latter approach in this paper. Because all the
variables in (9) are observable it is possible to estimate and test the significance of η and ε.
We shall return to issues of estimation and testing in Section 4.
Meanwhile, let us modify the simple assumption regarding the demand function in (1)
and consider the dominant producer model in which OPEC as a cartel collectively sets the oil
price when marginal revenues equal marginal costs. Non-OPEC producers or the competitive
fringe will then supply oil when marginal costs equal the oil price. The demand for OPEC oil
or “call on OPEC” is given by the residual demand, which is total demand for oil in the world
less supply of oil by the fringe. If we assume a standard world demand function depending on
the real consumer price of oil, while the supply of non-OPEC producers depends positively
on the real producer price of oil, the price elasticity of demand for OPEC oil, eOPEC , can be
expressed as3
(10) ε−1 = eOPEC = eW MSOPEC−1 − s(MSOPEC−1 − 1),
where eW < 0 is the price elasticity of world oil demand, s > 0 is the supply elasticity of
the fringe and MSOPEC is the market share of OPEC in the world oil market. The price
elasticity in (1) is then simply the inverse of the elasticity in (10). In this sense ε is not a
structural parameter, but rather a combination of such parameters. Because the market share
of OPEC is changing over time, ε is also a time varying parameter in (10). As pointed out by
Alhajji and Huettner (2000a) and Almoguera et al. (2011) among others, (10) is consistent
with the dominant producer model if the profit maximising OPEC operates on the elastic
part of its demand curve, that is when eOPEC < −1 . Otherwise, the profit maximisation
condition, saying that the oil price equals marginal cost times a mark-up, is rejected because
the oil price becomes negative.
Another possible model of OPEC behaviour is to assume that the cartel acts like a
Cournot player that takes into account that its decision regarding oil production influences
the price of oil, but that the cartel does not take into account possible reactions on output
by the fringe. In this case the perceived supply response by the fringe is zero and
(11) ε−1 = eOPEC = eW MSOPEC−1,
or ε = MSOPEC/eW .
To sum up, our model of OPEC behaviour encompasses several of the alternatives
discussed in the literature, including the competitive model, the imperfect competition model
of various forms and the Hotelling rule. We now proceed to confront our theoretical model
with data.
3 Background and data
As mentioned in the introduction, we analyse the behaviour of OPEC as a group. OPEC was
founded in Baghdad with the signing of an agreement in September 1960 by the five countries
3World demand for oil is XW = aP eW , where other factors than the oil price affecting demand are included
in the parameter a. Non-OPEC supply of oil is XNO = bP s, where other factors than the oil price affecting
supply are captured by the parameter b. The “call on OPEC” is X = XW − XNO = aP eW − bP s and the
market share of OPEC is MSOPEC = X/XW . The expression in (10) is then found by differentiating
log(X ) with respect to log(P).
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Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. These countries were
later joined by Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962), Libya (1962), the United Arab Emirates
(1967), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973), Gabon (1975) and Angola (2007).
From December 1992 until October 2007, Ecuador suspended its membership, whereas Gabon
terminated its membership in 1995. Indonesia suspended its membership in January 2009,
but this was reactivated from 1st January 2016. This means that, currently, OPEC has a
total of thirteen member countries.
Our model is based on the assumption that OPEC members coordinate their pro-
duction decisions in some way, although we are not explicit on the exact nature of this
cooperation. There are clearly periods in the history of OPEC where coordination does not
seem to be a reasonable assumption. In particular in periods of war between some member
states, it is hard to justify that they are coordinated, even if it is possible to argue that they
were coordinated within OPEC, but not otherwise. One obvious episode of some time dura-
tion is the war between Iraq and Iran. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is another more
recent example. The current system of production quotas was formally established in 1982,
indicating that some element of coordination was at least intended by the countries involved
at that time, see for example Smith (2005). However, Saudi Arabia stopped defending the
price in 1985 so it is reasonable to argue that OPEC changed behaviour in 1986, as pointed
out by Kaufmann et al. (2008) and Alkhathlan et al. (2014). Also, due to the Iraq-Kuwait
war in 1990 and the following US invasion of Iraq, we argue that estimation should start after
these conflicts. The empirical analysis is thus based on quarterly, seasonally unadjusted data
that spans the period 1992Q1−2015Q4, of which data from the period 1992Q1−2013Q4 and
2014Q1 − 2015Q4 are used for estimation and out-of-sample forecasting, respectively. Be-
cause OPEC members have not always been sticking to their quotas in absence of conflicts,
we use recursive methods to investigate whether our estimated models are stable in-sample.
We extend the estimation sample by eight quarters for forecasting to shed light on any change
in the behaviour of OPEC before and after the meeting in late November 2014.
Figure 1 displays quarterly time series of the variables in (9), namely OPEC production
(Xt) measured in million barrels per day, the nominal average OPEC export price on oil per
barrel (Pt) measured in US dollars, OPEC total lifting costs per barrel (Ct) measured in US
dollars and the US (annualised) ten year bond yield (rt), together with the market share of
OPEC (MSOPECt). Because the US ten year bond yield is annualised per definition, we
annualise Ct/Ct−1 to measure the variable (1 + rt)(1 + ct)−1 on the same frequency both in
the nominator and in the denominator. Data for OPEC production and the average OPEC
export price on oil and the US ten year bond yield are acquired from the web site of OPEC
and Macrobond, respectively.4 Total lifting costs are based on the method of Hansen and
Lindholt (2008) and are average supply costs and not marginal costs (ibid. p. 2944). As
Hansen and Lindholt (2008) present cost estimates for several OPEC members including
upper and lower bounds, we use a weighted average of the various cost estimates.
We clearly see that the production of OPEC, with some significant exceptions, has
increased steadily from around 24 million barrels per day in 1992 to around 35 million barrels
per day by the end of 2015. The supply of OPEC fell considerably through 2001 and 2002
alongside the international economic downturn before gradually picking up and reaching the
very high historical 1980-level by 2004. Also, the crude production of OPEC fell significantly
in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008. A similar picture is found when looking at the
market share of OPEC during the sample period, although the market share has never reached
4See http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/. Note that using the Saudi Arabian three month money market
interest rate instead of the US ten year bond yield as the discount rate does not change any of the empirical
findings qualitatively and hence any of the conclusions below.
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Figure 1: Time series of variables in (9)
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the level seen in the late 1970s.
The development in the crude production of OPEC coincides rather closely with the
development in the ratio between the oil price and the lifting costs (Pt/Ct), one important
explanatory variable in our theoretical model. For instance, OPEC reduced its production
by around 2 million barrels per day following the huge drop in the oil price from around 145
dollars per barrel by July 2008 to below 40 dollars per barrel before the end of 2008, see
Smith (2009). The market share of OPEC fell likewise by around 2 percentage points, down
from 44 per cent.
Surprisingly enough, however, OPEC decided not to cut its production on the Novem-
ber meeting in 2014 despite the huge drop in the oil price from the early summer that year.
OPEC has then increased its production and gained market shares alongside a continuing
fall in the oil price to around 40 dollars per barrel at the end of 2015 and further to below
30 dollars per barrel in January 2016. As noted in the introduction, we may see this as evi-
dence of OPEC having changed its behaviour to reduce supply of competitors like American
producers of shale oil.
The US ten year bond yield used as the discount rate has fallen from around 7 per
cent on average in 1992 to around 2 per cent on average in 2015. The lifting costs of OPEC
has, however, increased from about USD 7 per barrel on average in 1992 to about USD 11.5
per barrel on average in 2015. The huge spike in the variable (1 + rt)(1 + ct)−1 in the first
quarter of 2015 is mainly attributed to the fact that OPEC reduced its lifting costs by around
USD 2 per barrel or nearly 15 per cent during that quarter.
Turning to time series properties, we regard the crude production of OPEC as a non-
stationary I (1) variable because of its clear upward trend and no apparent mean reverting
property. The variables (1 + rt)(1 + ct)−1 and [Pt/Ct − (1 + rt)(1 + ct)−1Pt−1/Ct−1], on the
other hand, are not so clear-cut with respect to time series properties and may be regarded
as borderline cases of being either I (0) or I (1) variables. Therefore, we shall first assume
that a reduced rank vector autoregressive (VAR) model in accordance with (9) is a candidate
as an empirical model. Then, we shall relax the theoretical set up in (9) and postulate
that the supply of OPEC is not equilibrium correcting and only is determined by the ratio
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between the oil price and the production costs. We note that this alternative model of OPEC
behaviour is achieved by setting the variable (1+rt)(1+ct)−1 equal to unity, and is one simple
way of handling the potential stationarity property of the composite explanatory variables
in (9). In so doing, we assume that both Xt and Pt/Ct are non-stationary I (1) variables as
an underlying premise for the econometric analysis of the alternative model.
4 Cointegration analysis
Because multiple long run relationships may exist among the variables included in the theo-
retical model of the OPEC behaviour, we employ the Johansen (1995, p. 167) trace test for
cointegration rank determination. We thus start with an unrestricted p-dimensional VAR of
order k having the form
(12) Yt =
k∑
i=1
ΠiYt−i + μ + δt + ²t, t = k + 1, ..., T,
where Yt is a (p x 1) vector of modelled variables at time t, μ represents constants and
seasonals, δ is a (p x 1) coefficient vector of a linear deterministic trend t, Π1, ..., Πk are (p
x p) coefficient matrices of lagged level variables and ²k+1, ..., ²T are independent Gaussian
variables with expectation zero and (unrestricted) (p x p) covariance matrix Ω. The initial
observations Y1, ..., Yk are kept fixed.
The question now is how (12) can be reparameterised to a cointegrated VAR (hence-
forth CVAR) in which the OPEC behaviour can be formulated as a reduced rank restriction
on the impact matrix Π = −(I−Π1−...−Πk). The way the CVAR is formulated in our context
depends on the exogeneity status of the (1+rt)(1+ct)−1 series. First, we shall consider the case
when the (1+rt)(1+ct)−1 series is endogenous in the system, hence (12) is a three-dimensional
VAR in Yt = (Y1,t, Y2,t, Y3,t)′, where Y1,t = Xt, Y2,t = [Pt/Ct− (1+ rt)(1+ ct)−1Pt−1/Ct−1] and
Y3,t = (1 + rt)(1 + ct)
−1. If Yt is I(1), then the first difference ΔYt is I(0), implying either
Π = 0 or Π has reduced rank such that Π = αβ ′, where α and β are (3 x r) matrices and
0 < r < 3. Here r denotes the rank order of Π. Assuming for notational simplicity that k =
2, the CVAR becomes
(13) ΔYt = Γ1ΔYt−1 + αβ ′Yt−1 + μ + δt + ²t,
where β ′Yt−1 is an (r x 1) vector of stationary cointegration relations among Y1,t, Y2,t and Y3,t
and Γ1 = −Π2 is the (3 x 3) coefficient matrix of the lagged differenced variables. Next, we
shall consider the case when Y3,t is weakly exogenous for the long run parameters such that
valid inference on β can be obtained by considering the two-dimensional system of Y1,t and
Y2,t conditional on Y3,t without loss of information, see Johansen (1992). Following Harbo et
al. (1998), we may formulate the partial CVAR equivalent to (13) as (again assuming k = 2)
(14) Δ
(
Y1,t
Y2,t
)
= ωΔY3,t + γ1ΔYt−1 +
(
α11 α1r
α21 α2r
)
β′Yt−1 + μ1 + δ1t + ²1,t,
where ω and γ1 are (2 x 1) and (2 x 3) matrices, respectively. The corresponding marginal
model is ΔY3,t = γ2ΔYt−1 + μ2 + δ2t + ²2,t, where γ2 is a (1 x 3) vector. It follows that Y3,t
is included in the long-run part of (14) as a non-modelled variable. Because the number of
relevant variables to be included in (12), and hence the number of parameters to be estimated,
are potentially large relative to the number of observations in the sample period, it would be
useful to impose weak exogeneity on Y3,t. However, to know whether β can be estimated from
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(14) we first estimate the full system in (13) and test formally rather than assume the weak
exogeneity status of Y3,t in that system. We follow common practice and let inference about
the rank of β from the full system be based on unrestricted intercepts and a restricted linear
trend. Likewise, dummies capturing seasonality in the data enter the system unrestrictedly.
Strictly speaking, the cointegration rank does not have to be determined from the par-
tial system once it has been determined from the full system. Nevertheless, we re-determine
the cointegration rank from (14) for the sake of robustness check with the rank determination
from (13). As noted by Harbo et al. (1998), the asymptotic distribution of the trace test
statistic is influenced by conditioning on weakly exogenous variables and standard critical
values are thus not valid. We therefore use the critical values in Table 2 in Harbo et al.
(1998). Also, following the suggestions in Harbo et al. (1998) for partial systems, we restrict
the linear trend to lie in the cointegration space for inference purposes only. Then, after
having determined the cointegration rank, we test whether the linear trend can be dropped
from the cointegration relation(s) by applying a conventional χ2-test. As in the full system,
both the constants and the seasonals enter the partial system unrestrictedly.
Irrespective of specifying a full three-dimensional VAR in Yt = (Y1,t, Y2,t, Y3,t)′ or a
partial two-dimensional VAR in Y1,t and Y2,t conditional on Y3,t being exogenous to the
system, we find that k = 3 produces models with no serious misspecification according to
standard diagnostic tests.5 That said, the estimated residuals of the Y3,t-equation in the full
system, and thus also the estimated vector residuals, show some indication (at conventional
significance levels) of autocorrelation. Such a problem may in itself be an argument for
moving to a partial system to obtain more satisfying residual properties in our case, see
Juselius (2006, p. 198). We note that no impulse dummies other than one in the fourth
quarter of 2008 to mop up the recent financial crisis are needed to obtain Gaussian residuals
in the Y2,t-equation, and thus also in the partial system. Table 1 reports trace test statistics
for the full and the partial CVAR assuming k = 3.
Table 1: Tests for cointegration rank
Full CVAR Partial CVAR
r λi λtrace p-value r λi λtrace 5%Harbo
r = 0 0.39 69.67 0.000 r = 0 0.38 50.39 30.5
r ≤ 1 0.21 26.15 0.045 r ≤ 1 0.09 7.88 15.2
r ≤ 2 0.06 5.60 0.522
Notes: Sample period: 1992Q1 − 2013Q4. The underlying VARs are of order 3. The
full CVAR consists of Yt = (Y1,t, Y2,t, Y3,t)′, whereas the partial CVAR consists of Y1,t
and Y2,t with Y3,t as an exogenous variable. Both systems include unrestricted constants
and seasonals and a restricted linear trend. r denotes the cointegration rank, λi are the
eigenvalues from the reduced rank regressions, λtrace are the trace test statistics, p-value
are the significance probabilities from OxMetrics and 5%Harbo are the critical values (5 per
cent significance level) from Table 2 in Harbo et al. (1998).
We note that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected, whereas the
hypothesis of at most one cointegrating relationship between Y1,t, Y2,t and Y3,t cannot be
rejected at the 5 per cent significance level (albeit a borderline case) within the full CVAR.
Testing a zero restriction on the equilibrium correction coefficient of Y3,t under the assumption
of r = 1 gives χ2(1)=1.003 with a p-value of 0.32. Hence, Y3,t may be considered as weakly
exogenous for the cointegrating parameters, whose estimates can then be efficiently obtained
from the partial rather than the full system without loss of information. In so doing, we
5Whereas a VAR of order 2 provides similar diagnostics, a VAR of order 1 produces severe autocorrelation
in both the vector residuals and in the residuals of the Y1,t-equation and the Y3,t-equation of the full system.
Results from the diagnostic tests of the VARs are available from the authors upon request.
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also save degrees of freedom. The formal tests in Table 1 support the hypothesis that r = 1
also in the case of the partial CVAR. Assuming the rank to be unity, a likelihood ratio test
of model reduction [see Doornik and Hendry (2009, p. 51)] from a CVAR with the linear
trend to a CVAR without the linear trend (δ1 = 0), yields χ2(1)=1.58 with a p-value of 0.21.
The linear trend is thus insignificant and excluded from the reduced rank partial VAR when
testing the OPEC behaviour further based on the economic model in (9). Table 2 reports
likelihood ratio tests about α = (α1, α2)′ and β = (β1, β2, β3)
′ in (14) for r = 1.
Table 2: Likelihood ratio tests of the OPEC behaviour
Hypothesis LR tests p-values
α1 = 0 χ
2(1) = 7.25 0.007
α2 = 0 χ
2(1) = 31.57 0.000
β1 = 0 χ
2(1) = 5.11 0.024
β2 = 0 χ
2(1) = 38.50 0.000
β3 = 0 χ
2(1) = 14.87 0.000
Notes: Sample period: 1992Q1−2013Q4. All likelihood ratio (LR) tests with degrees of freedom
in parentheses are based on the partial CVAR with r = 1 and and without a linear trend. Y3,t
is weakly exogenous to the system. The exclusion test of Y1,t is based on normalizing on Y3,t,
whereas the exclusion tests of Y2,t and Y3,t are based on normalizing on Y1,t.
First, we observe that weak exogeneity of both Y1,t and Y2,t for the long run parameters,
in contrast to Y3,t is rejected. Also, the likelihood ratio tests reject the hypothesis that the
modelled variables Y1,t and Y2,t as well as the conditional variable Y3,t are excluded from
β. Hence, we obtain the following unrestricted cointegrating vector (normalized on OPEC
production measured in million barrels per day)
Y1,t = const. + 16.173
(2.400)
Y2,t + 43.632
(11.152)
Y3,t,(15)
with standard errors in parentheses. The associated vector of equilibrium correction coeffi-
cients is estimated to α = (−0.019, 0.052)′ with corresponding t-values equal to −2.58 and
5.83, respectively. Because any deviations from (15), due to say a shock in Y3,t, are also signif-
icantly corrected through the adjustment of OPEC production, we regard the estimated coin-
tegrating vector as a long run relationship of OPEC behaviour consistent with the economic
model in (9). Besides, it is evident from Figure 2 that êqcmt = Y1,t − 16.173Y2,t − 43.632Y3,t
has a mean reversion property, indicating a stationary I (0) variable over the sample period.
The two big spikes in êqcmt in the fourth quarter of 2008 and in the first quarter of 2015 are
related to the huge drop in the oil price, which reduces Y2,t significantly in these two quarters,
cf. Figure 1.
To compute the implied estimates of the parameters of interest, η and ε, we normalize
on Y3,t, such that Y3,t = const.− ηY1,t − (1 + ε)Y2,t, to get
Y3,t = const. + 0.023
(0.010)
Y1,t − 0.371
(0.048)
Y2,t,(16)
with standard errors in parentheses. We observe that η̂ = −0.023 and ε̂ = −0.629 are
significantly estimated with t-values equal to −2.27 and −13.10, respectively. Both estimates
are consistent with the OPEC behaviour inherent in (9). In particular, the fact that the
estimates are non-zero implies that the Hotelling rule is rejected by the data. The negative
estimates of η, although relatively small in magnitude, implies that OPEC production costs
depend positively on oil reserves, such that accumulated production decreases the costs.
Hence, we find support for Arrow’s (1962) learning by doing hypothesis. Finally, the estimate
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Figure 2: Time series of deviations of (15)
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of the inverse price elasticity ε is well within its interval of having a plausible economic
interpretation.
Given our estimate of ε̂ = −0.629 it follows from the discussion in Section 2 that
êOPEC = −1.589 on average over the sample period. The magnitude of the price elasticity of
demand for OPEC oil is thus consistent with the dominant producer model. Using (10) as
the relevant formula for calculating the implied price elasticity of oil in the world market and
assuming that s = 0.2 and MSOPEC = 0.42, cf. Figure 1, we calibrate eW to be −0.55.6
However, using (11) the estimate of eW becomes −0.67. As pointed out by Nakov and Nuño
(2013), who calibrate their model using −0.25 and −0.05 as values of the price elasticity of oil
demand, there is some disagreement in the literature about the magnitude of this elasticity.
Our estimates fall well within the range used by Gately (2007), but are fairly high in absolute
value compared to for example Alhajji and Huettner (2000a) and Krichene (2002) who find
the long run estimate of eW to be −0.12 and close to zero, respectively.
5 Dynamic models
Having established an empirical counterpart to (9), we now compare and contrast the em-
pirical performance of two competing dynamic models of OPEC behaviour, both in-sample
and out-of-sample. To this end, we first estimate a partial CVAR utilizing the findings from
the cointegration analysis above. We then estimate, as discussed in Section 3, an alternative
single equation dynamic model by relaxing the theoretical set up in (9) such that the supply
of OPEC only is determined by the ratio between the oil price and the production costs.
Since we found support for weak exogeneity of Y3,t, we can without loss of information
abstract from modelling the marginal model for this variable and focus on a CVAR for Y1,t
and Y2,t, which is fully in accordance with the reduced rank VAR in Section 4. Our point of
6Assuming that s = 0.1 and s = 0.3, the estimates of eW become −0.61 and −0.49, respectively.
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departure is therefore the general partial model written as
(17) Δ
(
Y1,t
Y2,t
)
= θ1ΔY3,t + θ2ΔYt−1 + θ3ΔYt−2 +
(
α1
α2
)
êqcmt−1 + θ0 + εt,
where θ0 represents constants, seasonals (SD1t, SD2t and SD3t) and the impulse dummy for
the financial crisis (d08q4). Note that (17) is balanced in the terminology of Banerjee et al.
(1993, p. 166) when Y1,t, Y2,t and Y3,t all are non-stationary I (1) variables and when êqcmt is
a stationary I (0) variable. We estimate (17) by full information maximum likelihood (FIML)
and find that the resulting model has well behaved residuals according to standard diagnostic
tests. The general estimated model thus serves as a starting point for the reduction process
to obtain a parsimonious representation of (17). A parsimonious model is found by stepwise
exclusion of insignificant variables in the system one by one, relying on the Sargan test for
overidentifying restrictions and making sure that the well-behaved residuals are retained.
Based on this general-to-specific modelling strategy, we obtain the following parsi-
monious model together with diagnostics7, standards errors of coefficients (in parenthesis),
standard errors of equations (σˆ) and the outcome of the Sargan test:
ΔŶ1,t = 0.409
(0.104)
ΔY1,t−1 − 0.226
(0.098)
ΔY1,t−2 − 0.125
(0.055)
ΔY2,t−2 − 0.0177
(0.004)
êqcmt−1(18)
−0.437
(0.104)
+ 0.353
(0.133)
SD1t + 0.520
(0.130)
SD3t
σˆ = 0.467
AR1−5: F (5, 76) = 0.24 [0.94], ARCH1−4: F (4, 80) = 1.63 [0.18]
NORM : χ2(2) = 0.16 [0.92], HET : F (10, 77) = 1.11 [0.37]
ΔŶ2,t = −3.114
(0.703)
ΔY3,t + 0.0486
(0.0047)
êqcmt−1 + 0.859
(0.097)
− 5.202
(0.559)
d08q4
σˆ = 0.558
AR1−5: F (5, 79) = 2.16 [0.07], ARCH1−4: F (4, 80) = 2.33 [0.06]
NORM : χ2(2) = 2.01 [0.37], HET : F (4, 83) = 0.31 [0.87]
FIML, T = 88 (1992Q1− 2013Q4)
V ector AR1−5: F (20, 144) = 1.09 [0.37]
V ector NORM : χ2(4) = 1.99 [0.74]
V ector HET : F (72, 183) = 0.87 [0.75]
Sargan test: χ2(15) = 10.64 [0.78]
The diagnostics, both single equation test statistics and vector test statistics, indicate
that (18) is well specified and the Sargan test supports the restrictions imposed on the model.
All the economic variables entering the model are highly significant. The production of OPEC
seems to be rather persistent as represented by the significant autoregressive coefficients of
ΔY1,t−1 and ΔY1,t−2. The êqcmt−1 appears with a t-value of −4.4 in the specification for
7AR1−5 is a test for until 5th order residual autocorrelation; ARCH1−4 is a test for until 4th order autore-
gressive conditional heteroskedasticity in the residuals; NORM is a joint test for residual normality (no skew-
ness and excess kurtosis) and HET is a test for residual heteroskedasticity. V ector AR1−5, V ector NORM
and V ector HET are the corresponding test statistics for the system as a whole, see Doornik and Hendry
(2009, p. 168). The numbers in square brackets are p-values.
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Figure 3: Recursive statistics of (18)
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Y1,t, hence adding force to the results obtained from the cointegration analysis. We do not
find any short run effects on Y1,t from Y3,t, only lagged, but relatively small short run effects
from Y2,t. No contemporaneous short run effects and the small magnitude of the estimated
adjustment coefficient of −0.018 together imply rather slow adjustment in the production of
OPEC in the face of shocks in the oil price, the costs of production or the interest rate.
Turning to the specification for Y2,t, we find that this variable also error corrects when
departing from the long run equilibrium. A positive shock in say OPEC production will
thus be transmitted to increased Y2,t through the highly significant êqcmt−1 term, possibly
reflecting that reduced extraction costs due to learning by doing effects in OPEC production
dominate negative effects on the oil price. Normalising the cointegrating vector on Y2,t, we
find that the estimated adjustment coefficient is −0.79, indicating a much faster adjustment
towards equilibrium than what production of OPEC does. This may not be very surprising
as Y2,t consists of oil prices and production costs, which are more easily changed in the short
run. Finally, we find some contemporaneous effects of Y3,t on Y2,t and large negative effects
from the impulse dummy d08q4 due to the huge drop in the oil price of around 110 dollars
per barrel from the third to the fourth quarter of 2008.
As mentioned in the introduction, we use recursive methods to investigate whether
(18) exhibits empirical constancy in-sample. Figure 3 depicts the recursive residuals with
±2σˆt and the scaled log-likelihood function as T increases (i.e., the recursively computed
Sargan test) in the first row, the sequence of one step Chow tests in the second row, the
sequence of break point Chow tests in the third row and the sequence of forecast Chow tests
in the fourth row, all of which are scaled by their 1 per cent critical values, see Doornik
and Hendry (2009, p. 75). We see from the recursive residuals and the one step Chow tests
that there are some minor instabilities in the specification for Y2,t in 2008/2009 during the
financial crisis. That said, there is no evidence of instabilities in the specification for Y1,t and
the system as a whole and the hypothesis that (18) parsimoniously encompasses the general
system is not rejected for any sample sizes. Unlike Almoguera et al. (2011) and Alkhathlan
et al. (2014), we therefore argue that the OPEC behaviour has not changed significantly
in-sample.
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Figure 4: Recursive statistics of (19)
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To investigate whether there may be any improvement in the empirical performance
of the model in-sample, we ignore the findings from the cointegration analysis and estimate
an alternative dynamic model for ΔY1,t based on ΔY1,t−1, ΔY1,t−2, ΔY4,t, ΔY4,t−1, ΔY4,t−2, 1,
SD1t, SD2t and SD3t as regressors, where Y4,t = Pt/Ct. In so doing, we follow the alternative
hypothesis in Section 3 about the time series properties of the variables involved and assume
that both Y1,t and Y4,t are non-stationary I (1) variables and that Y2,t and Y3,t both are
stationary I (0) variables. Under these assumptions, and the fact that Y3,t is set equal to
unity such that Y2,t becomes equal to ΔY4,t, the alternative dynamic model is balanced. For
comparison reasons, the alternative general model includes the same lag length of the variables
as in the general CVAR. We rely on the general-to-specific modelling strategy available in
the autometrics procedure in OxMetrics when estimating the alternative dynamic model, see
Doornik and Hendry (2009). Using OLS, autometrics picks the following specific alternative
dynamic model:8
ΔŶ1,t = 0.239
(0.094)
ΔY1,t−1 + 0.135
(0.069)
ΔY4,t + 0.229
(0.072)
ΔY4,t−1 + 0.284
(0.106)
SD3,t(19)
OLS, T = 88 (1992Q1− 2013Q4), σˆ = 0.485
AR1−5: F (5, 79) = 0.98 [0.44], ARCH1−4: F (4, 80) = 2.42 [0.055],
NORM : χ2(2) = 0.54 [0.76], HET : F (7, 80) = 0.56 [0.79].
We see that the alternative model, just like (18), is well specified, albeit the test
for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity now is a borderline case at the 5 per cent
significance level. The two estimated models are quite different with respect to the effects
on OPEC production from the autoregressive terms and the seasonal dummies. We note
8The target size of the reduction process matters for the outcome of the specific model. We present the
model based on 0.10 as the target size. Using a target size of 0.05 autometrics picks a specific model which
has poorer fit in-sample.
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Figure 5: Actual values and dynamic (ex ante) forecasts of Y1,t ± 2σˆt
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that no constant term is significantly estimated in (19) in accordance with (9) when Y3,t is
set equal to unity. Also, the alternative model includes contemporaneous as well as lagged
effects from Y4,t, effects which only come about through lags of Y2,t in (18). The estimated
standard error, σˆ, increases somewhat and indicates that (19) has slightly poorer fit than
(18) in-sample. Figure 4 shows that (19) is reasonable stable within sample except for one
significant instability around 2000, as revealed by the one step Chow tests.
To assess the forecasting performance of the two competing dynamic models of OPEC
behaviour, we employ eight quarters (2014Q1 − 2015Q4) of out-of-sample observations, in-
cluding the OPEC meeting in November 2014. Figure 5 depicts actual values of Y1,t together
with dynamic (ex ante) forecasts based on (18) and (19), adding bands of 95 per cent con-
fidence intervals to each forecast. Generally, the out-of-sample forecasting ability is quite
poor for both models. Although the actual values of Y1,t all stay within their corresponding
confidence intervals, we see that (18) systematically underpredicts the production of OPEC
during the entire forecasting period. At the end of 2015 the model underpredicts the produc-
tion of OPEC by almost 2.5 million barrels per day or by around 7 per cent. The forecasting
properties of the alternative model are even worse. The actual values for the last three
quarters of 2015 are either on or outside the confidence intervals and (19) underpredicts the
production of OPEC by as much as 4 million barrels per day or nearly 12 per cent at the end
of 2015. As a result, the RMSE (root mean square errors) statistics of the forecasts based on
(19) is 2.3 compared to 1.3 based on (18).
Using a sequence of parameter constancy forecast Chow tests, we can detect whether
there are any significant structural breaks in the forecasting period, see Doornik and Hendry
(2009, p. 36). We find that these test statistics based on (18) are far from being significant
for the first three quarters of 2014. However, from the fourth quarter of 2014 and to the end
of the forecasting period, these test statistics are highly significant with p-values of close to
zero in all cases. Since a significant structural break is occurring in the fourth quarter of 2014,
we conclude that OPEC indeed changed its behaviour following the meeting in November
2014.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have formulated a theoretical model of OPEC behaviour that encompasses
a number of hypotheses discussed in the literature, among them price taking behaviour, im-
perfect competition in various forms and the Hotelling rule. Confronting the model with
quarterly data for the period 1992 to 2015, we found support for the imperfect market hy-
pothesis regarding the output decisions of OPEC. Our average estimate of the price elasticity
of demand for OPEC oil is significantly less than minus unity, consistent with the dominant
producer model. Besides, we found that costs of extraction are significantly affected by
the resource stock through learning by doing effects in OPEC production, invalidating the
Hotelling rule.
We have also shown that a dynamic equilibrium correction model exhibits reasonable
empirical constancy in-sample and has somewhat better fit than an alternative dynamic model
with weaker theoretical underpinnings. The alternative dynamic model lacks the underlying
theory of OPEC behaviour as the findings from the cointegration analysis are ignored, a
major disadvantage because the parameters of interest, the price elasticity of oil demand in
particular, are impossible to infer from that model. We therefore argue that there is value
added of having a cointegration relationship in the dynamic model of OPEC behaviour once
it is supported by the data, as is the case in our context.
A forecasting exercise revealed, however, that the dynamic equilibrium correction
model systematically underpredicts OPEC production over the last two years. At the end of
2015 the model underpredicts OPEC production by almost 2.5 million barrels per day. We
also found evidence of a significant structural break in the fourth quarter of 2014, coinciding
with the OPEC meeting in November 2014. Our findings suggest that the OPEC behaviour
regarding output decisions indeed has changed significantly out-of-sample, probably to pro-
tect its market share by limiting the role of competitors like American producers of shale
oil.
An interesting question that arises is to what extent the change in the behaviour of
OPEC has affected world oil prices after the meeting in November 2014. While beyond the
scope of this paper, a more comprehensive model of world demand and supply for crude oil
seems to be needed to describe the behaviour of OPEC in recent years. We leave this for
future work.
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